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NOTES
A STATE COURT'S REFUSAL TO
ANSWER CERTIFIED QUESTIONS: ARE
INFERENCES PERMITTED?
Certified questions1 provide a mechanism for a federal court
considering an unclear question of a state's law to ask the highest
court of that state to declare its position on the issue.' Answers to
' See Gerald M. Levin, Note, Inter-Jurisdictional Certification: Beyond Abstention
Toward Cooperative Judicial Federalism, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 344, 348 (1963). There are two
types of certification-interjurisdictional and intrajurisdictional. Id. Intrajurisdictional cer-
tification occurs when the certifying and answering courts are from the same state or are
both federal courts. Id. Interjurisdictional certification occurs when a federal court horizon-
tally certifies a question to a state court or when the certifying and answering courts are
from two different states. Id. Interjurisdictional certification can also refer to certification
from a state court to a federal court. See id. at 348 n.37. This type of certification is unnec-
essary, however, since the Supreme Court can review a state court's determination of a fed-
eral question. Id.
In 1945, Florida became the first state to enact a certification statute, allowing the fed-
eral courts and the Supreme Court to certify questions of state law to Florida's Supreme
Court. Richard B. Lillich & Raymond T. Mundy, Federal Court Certification of Doubtful
State Lau, Questions, 18 UCLA L. REV. 888, 891 (1971); see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (West
1988) (authorizing use of certification). However, the Florida certification procedure was not
utilized until the 1960 case of Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960), in which the
Supreme Court indicated that the Florida certification statute should have been used to
obtain a clear view of the uncertain state law involved in the case. Id. at 212. Justice Frank-
furter stated that "[t]he Florida legislature, with rare foresight, has dealt with the problem
of authoritatively determining unresolved state law involved in federal litigation by a stat-
ute which permits a federal court to certify such a doubtful question of state law to the
Supreme Court of Florida for its decision." Id. at 212.
1 Jack J. Rose, Note, Erie R.R. and State Power to Control State Law: Switching
Tracks to New Certification of Questions of Law Procedures, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 421, 425
(1989); see also John B. Corr & Ira P. Robbins, Interjurisdictional Certification and Choice
of Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 411, 413 (1988) ("Certification is the process by which the first
court may inquire of a court in the jurisdiction whose law is at issue for help in determining
what the law is."). Unsettled state law creates the need for the certification process. See,
e.g., Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974) (explaining that certification particu-
larly appropriate in light of novel question and unsettled Florida law); Puckett v.
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certified questions provide the certifying court with an authorita-
tive determination of the state law3 and relieve it of the onerous
task of predicting how the state court would decide the matter.4
Rufenacht, Bromagen & Hertz, Inc., 903 F.2d 1014, 1021 (5th Cir. 1990) (certifying ques-
tions directly to Mississippi Supreme Court when Mississippi law "sufficiently unclear");
Dorse v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 1372, 1377 (11th Cir. 1986) (certifying
question because of "dearth of Florida authority"); see also John A. Scanelli, Note, The
Case for Certification, 12 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 627, 627 (1971) (noting that certification
"utilized by the federal courts when faced with the task of interpreting uncertain state
law"); Geri J. Yonover, Ascertaining State Law: The Continuing Erie Dilemma, 38 DEPAUL
L. REv. 1, 18 (1989) (explaining how certification by federal court to state's highest court
resolves unsettled state law questions). See generally 17A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4248 at 158 (1988) (discussing use of certification when
state law is unclear); CHARLES A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52, at 315 (4th ed.
1983) (lower federal courts "have often certified unclear questions of state law to state
courts").
A recent study on the use of certification among federal and state judges indicated that
there was "overwhelming judicial support" of the certification procedure as a means of de-
termining unclear state law. See Corr & Robbins, supra, at 457.
See Clay, 363 U.S. at 212; United States v. Buras, 475 F.2d 1370, 1371, 1375 (5th Cir.
1972) (Brown, J., dissenting) (through the certification procedure "the objective of an au-
thoritative determination with finality can be attained"). In National Educ. Ass'n v. Lee
County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 467 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1972), the court of appeals, noting
that "the wisdom of certification ... is apparent," id. at 449-50, stated that, in light of the
Florida Supreme Court's response to a certified question, it was able to conclude with "abso-
lute assurance" that the district court incorrectly decided the case, id. at 448.
' See Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943). In Meredith, the
Supreme Court held that even though the state law is contradictory or difficult to ascertain,
a federal court cannot refuse jurisdiction. Id.
In the absence of certification, many federal courts use the prediction method as a
means of determining state law. See Note, The Uniform Certification of Questions of Law
Act, 55 IowA L. REV. 465, 466 (1969) [hereinafter Note, Uniform Certification of Law Act].
Under this procedure, a federal court must anticipate how the state's highest court would
resolve the state law issues in the case. Id. at 466-67; John D. Butzner, Jr. & Mary N. Kelly,
Certification: Assuring the Primacy of State Law in the Fourth Circuit, 42 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 449, 449 (1985); Levin, supra note 1, at 345. One guideline established for predicting
state law required federal judges to determine "[wIhat would be the decision of reasonable
intelligent lawyers, sitting as judges of the highest [state] court, and fully conversant with
[the state] 'jurisprudence'?" Cooper v. American Airlines, Inc., 149 F.2d 355, 359 (2d Cir.
1945).
A federal judge employing the prediction method must examine and weigh the philoso-
phy, background, and personality of the state's highest court and determine how these fac-
tors influence the court's decision. Note, Uniform Certification of Law Act, supra, at 466.
Furthermore, "[hie must decide if the state court is developing or would want to develop a
trend away from older decisional law, whether the state court would be influenced by analo-
gous cases in related areas of law, and whether the state court would rely heavily on the
decisions of lower state courts." Id. The federal judge may also consider to what extent the
state court would be influenced by restatements, law review articles, treatises, decisions
from other jurisdictions and public policy. Id. at 466-67; see, e.g., Southern Farm Bureau
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 312 F.2d 485, 497 (8th Cir. 1963) (determining outcome with
aid of Arkansas Law Review); Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159, 161 (D.S.D.
CERTIFIED QUESTIONS
The majority of states recognize the advantages of certification and
have adopted some version of a certification statute. 5 The mere ex-
istence of such a statute, however, does not guarantee a response
to all certified questions.6 Presumably, when a state's highest court
1967) (deciding case after resorting to Restatement of Torts), aff'd, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.
1969); see also JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4.6, at 221-22 (1985) (dis-
cussing use of scholarly works to ascertain state law).
The prediction method has several drawbacks. First, "[ilt is time consuming and diffi-
cult to administer." Note, Uniform Certification of Law Act, supra, at 467. Second, "[s]ince
the state court could subsequently decide the same issue differently, other individuals can-
not safely rely on the federal court's prediction in conducting their affairs." Id.; see also
John M. Dunn, Case Note, Exercising the Power to Answer Federal Court Certification of
State Law Questions: Hanchey v. Steighner, 12 LAND & WATER L. REV. 337, 337 (1977)
("The drawback [for a federal court] in predicting state law is that the rule laid down may
later be reversed by state decision . . . ."); see also Peterson v. U-Haul Co., 409 F.2d 1174,
1177 (8th Cir.) (prediction "is a hazardous and unsatisfactory method of deciding litiga-
tion"), modified, 421 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1969). For a discussion of the prediction method, see
Note, The Ascertainment of State Law in a Federal Diversity Case, 40 IND. L.J. 541, 549-55
(1965) [hereinafter Note, Ascertainment of State Law].
In Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940), the Supreme Court allowed
federal courts to apply the decisions of lower state courts as a way of ascertaining state law.
See id. at 177 ("[It is still the duty of the federal courts, where the state law supplies the
rule of decision, to ascertain and apply that law even though it has not been expounded by
the highest court of the State.") (footnote omitted). As a result of Field, federal courts be-
gan to rely on decisions of state courts even where the precedential value was weak. See,
e.g., Gustin v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 154 F.2d 961, 962 (6th Cir.) (applying unreported
state court decision), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 866 (1946).
The Supreme Court retreated from this extreme view in King v. Order of United Com-
mercial Travelers of Am., 333 U.S. 153, 162 (1948). The Court held that a decision in the
South Carolina Court of Common Pleas would not be binding on other federal courts since
it was not binding on other South Carolina courts. Id. at 161. The Supreme Court finally
came to a definitive conclusion on the function of lower state court decisions in Commis-
sioner v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967). There the Court held that "[i]f there be no decision by
[the state's final appellate court] then federal authorities must apply what they find to be
the state law after giving 'proper regard' to relevant rulings of other courts of the State." Id.
at 465. See generally FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra § 4.6 at 217-21 (tracing development of
function of lower court decisions in determining applicable state law).
See Note, New York's Certification Procedure: Was it Worth the Wait?, 63 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 539, 545 n.26 (1989) (listing jurisdictions that have adopted certification stat-
utes). Certification statutes vary from state to state; some authorize certification from fed-
eral district and appellate courts, while others allow certification only from federal appellate
courts and the Supreme Court. See id.
6 See UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT § 1 Commissioner's cmt., 12
U.L.A. 49, 52 (1990). The Commissioner's comment to § 1 of the Uniform Act states that a
court is not required to answer a certified question. Id.; see also Abrams v. West Virginia
Racing Comm'n, 263 S.E.2d 103, 105 (W. Va. 1980) (concluding that West Virginia certifica-
tion statute "does not impose an absolute duty on this Court to answer such questions").
State courts have refused to respond to certified questions for a variety of reasons. See,
e.g., Thompson v. State, 170 N.W.2d 101, 103 (Minn. 1969) (abstract question); Cowan v.
Ford Motor Co., 437 So. 2d 46, 47 (Miss. 1983) (statute previously ruled upon by state's
highest court); Holden v. N L Indus., Inc., 629 P.2d 428, 430 (Utah 1981) (violative of state
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refuses to respond to a certified question, the certifying court must
resolve the unsettled state law issue itself 7 However, in Hotvedt v.
Schlumberger Ltd.,8 a recent fifth circuit case, Judge Garza argued
in his dissent that the Texas Supreme Court's refusal to answer a
certified question gave rise to an inference that the Texas court
agreed with the fifth circuit's earlier ruling on an unresolved ques-
tion of Texas law.9 Thus, according to Judge Garza's view, it would
be fruitless for the certifying court to attempt to resolve the is-
sue.10 It is submitted that permitting inferences from a state
court's refusal to answer a certified question would defeat the pur-
poses and policies underlying the certification process" and that
the Hotvedt dissent was mistaken in suggesting that such infer-
ences could logically be drawn.
Part One of this Note will explore the development of the cer-
tification procedure and analyze how allowing an inference from
the refusal of a state's highest court to reply to a certified question
undermines the purposes and policies behind these questions. Part
Two will discuss the various reasons why a state's highest court
would refuse to answer a certified question. Finally, Part Three
constitution). The Committee on Federal Courts has noted that "there are many reasons
why... state courts on occasion have chosen not to answer the questions certified at all or
in the manner in which they were presented." The Committee on Federal Courts, Analysis
of State Laws Providing for Certification by Federal Courts of Determinative State Issues
of Law, 42 REc. ASS'N B. CITY N.Y. 101, 102 (1987); see also infra notes 42-59 and accompa-
nying text (discussing reasons for refusing to answer certified questions).
See supra note 4 (discussing methods for determining state law).
8 942 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 298. (Garza, J., dissenting). In Hotvedt, the Texas saving statute would have
tolled the statute of limitations on the plaintiff's suit if, as a matter of Texas law, the grant-
ing of a stay in a California court on forum non conveniens grounds was equivalent to a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. Id. The original panel decision of the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that the stay in the California court on the grounds of forum non
conveniens was a disclaimer of jurisdiction. Id. at 296. On a petition for rehearing, the court
of appeals reversed and concluded that the California court's stay is not considered tanta-
mount to a dismissal. Id. at 297. Before the second panel hearing, the issue was certified to
the Texas Supreme Court, which refused to answer. Id. at 296. Judge Garza concluded:
"[T]he most logical inference to be drawn is that the Supreme Court of Texas agreed with
our original panel opinion .... I cannot believe that if .the majority of the Texas Supreme
Court Justices had thought our opinion was wrong that they would have allowed it to
stand." Id. at 298 (Garza, J., dissenting). '
"° See id. at 298 (Garza, J., dissenting). Judge Garza believed that the court did not
have to decide any issues since the Texas Supreme Court, by its silence, concluded that a
stay on the basis of forum non conveniens was equivalent to a dismissal due to lack of
jurisdiction under the Texas saving statute. Id. Under his theory, the issue was already
resolved, and there was nothing for the certifying court to do. Id.
" See infra notes 12-41 and accompanying text.
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will analogize the refusal of a state's highest court to answer a cer-
tified question with the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, and
conclude that an inference is impermissible when a certified ques-
tion is not answered.
I. POLICY AND PURPOSE OF CERTIFICATION
A. Development of Certification
The need for the certification process can be traced back to
the landmark case of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,12 in which the
Supreme Court held that federal courts exercising diversity juris-
diction 13 must apply state decisional as well as statutory law. 4
Writing for the majority, Justice Brandeis observed that "[t]here is
no federal general common law.' 5 Consequently, the law applica-
ble in all cases not governed by the United States Constitution or
by congressional enactments is the-law of the state. 6
Unfortunately, federal courts often face substantial obstacles
when attempting to determine the status of state law on a given
issue.' 7 These difficulties led to the development of the "abstention
22 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
'3 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Under diversity jurisdiction, "[tihe judicial Power shall
extend to Controversies between Citizens of different states ... and between a state, or the
Citizens thereof and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." Id. Diversity jurisdiction is codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988). See generally FRIEDENTHAL, ET AL., supra note 4 §§ 2.5-2.7
(discussing various aspects of diversity jurisdiction).
'4 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. Erie overruled the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1
(1842), in which the Supreme Court held that federal courts hearing diversity cases could
adopt federal common law if no state statute was applicable, id. at 18-19. In Erie, Justice
Brandeis explained that the Swift doctrine created many problems, including discrimination
by non-citizens against state citizens in federal courts. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 73-77. See
generally FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 4, §§ 4.1-4.2 (explaining Swift and Erie doctrines).
25 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
26 See Stanton S. Kaplan, Note, Certification of Questions from Federal Appellate
Courts to the Florida Supreme Court and Its Impact on the Abstention Doctrine, 16 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 413, 415 (1962).
'7 See Note, Ascertainment of State Law, supra note 4, at 542-43. For example, the
Erie court never explained how a federal court sitting in diversity should choose which
state's law to apply. Id. at 540. This problem was later corrected by Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1947), in which Justice Reed declared that the law of the
forum state should be applied in diversity cases. Id. at 496. However, determining the law of
the forum state proved troublesome; state law "may range from decisions and dicta of the
highest court of the state through intermediate state court decisions and even down to trial
court decisions, opinions of the state bar, and local administrative rulings." Note, Ascertain-
ment of State Law, supra note 4, at 542-43.
At times, the statute being construed is ambiguous or there are no "clear and control-
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doctrine," under which a federal court, in narrow circumstances,
may refuse to decide a case involving unclear issues of state law
when a decision on the state law issue might raise a federal consti-
tutional question.' Courts employing this doctrine retain jurisdic-
tion while affording the litigants an opportunity to seek an author-
itative determination of the issues from the courts of the state
whose law controls."' However, while the abstention doctrine al-
lows federal courts to avoid predicting a state court's views, the
process is costly and time consuming.20 The certification process
ling precedents from the highest state court." Brian Mattis, Certification of Questions of
State Law: An Impractical Tool in the Hands of the Federal Courts, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV.
717, 718 (1969); see supra note 4 (examining methods used following Erie to determine state
law).
8 See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499-500 (1941). The abstention
doctrine was first announced in Pullman where the Court held that the district court should
not have avoided a fourteenth amendment question through its construction of an ambigu-
ous Texas statute. Id. at 499-500. The Court stayed the federal action and instructed the
parties to seek an interpretation of the Texas law from the state courts. Id. at 502. The
Pullman abstention doctrine promotes the policy against the unnecessary resolution of con-
stitutional questions by permitting federal courts to evaluate the constitutionality of state
laws only where there has been an authoritative determination of those laws. See Theodore
B. Eichelberger, Note, Certification Statutes: Engineering a Solution to Pullman Absten-
tion Delay, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1339, 1339-40 (1984). See generally, 17A WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 2 §§ 4241-4247 (discussing Pullman type abstention and other situations where
abstention is allowed).
It is important to note that under the Pullman abstention doctrine, the federal courts
still retain jurisdiction. The action is held in abeyance while the parties receive a determina-
tion from the state courts. Larry M. Roth, Certified Questions from the Federal Courts:
Review and Re-Proposal, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 5 (1979); see also Harrison v. N.A.A.C.P.,
360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959) (abstention "does not, of course, involve the abdication of federal
jurisdiction, but only the postponement of its exercise"). See generally William C. Bednar.
Jr., Comment, Abstention Under Delaney: A Current Appraisal, 49 TEX. L. REV. 247, pas-
sim (1971) (discussing and evaluating abstention process).
"9 Supra note 18; see, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S.
25, 30 (1959) (upholding abstention order to allow Louisiana Supreme Court to interpret
questionable statute); United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483, 484-85 (5th Cir.)
(en banc) (ordering abstention so parties can receive state interpretation of insurance con-
tracts), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964).
20 See Levin, supra note 1, at 346-47. To obtain a definitive disposition of state law, the
litigants must proceed to the final appellate court in the state. Id. If the final appellate court
has original jurisdiction, the parties can proceed directly to it. Otherwise, they must pass
through the state judicial hierarchy. Id.; see Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 150 (1976) (not-
ing time delays created by abstention process); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd. 363 U.S. 207, 227
(1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (criticizing "practice of making litigants travel a long, expen-
sive road in order to obtain justice"); see also Charles E. Clark, Federal Procedural Reform
and States' Rights; to a More Perfect Union, 40 TEx. L. REV. 211, 221 (1961) ("As a result
of this doctrine ... cases have been dragged out over eight and ten year periods."); Corr &
Robbins, supra note 2, at 416 ("Abstention's consequence for the swift, efficient application
of justice is obvious."); Mattis, supra note 17, at 719 (explaining time delay caused by ab-
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was first utilized as a means to avoid the delay and expense cre-
ated by abstention, 21 but its use has not been limited to situations
in which abstention would be required.22
B. Obtaining an Authoritative Determination of State Law
Certification satisfies the need for authoritative determina-
tions of unclear state law, 3 while mitigating the disadvantages
caused by abstention. 4 For instance, the Uniform Certification of
Questions of Law Act ("Uniform Act")2 5 insures an authoritative
stention and concluding "the abstention doctrine cannot be viewed as a particularly bright
chapter in the history of American jurisprudence").
21 See Clay, 363 U.S. at 209-12. In Clay, the first case in which the Court directed the
use of a certification statute, see supra note 1, the case was remanded to determine ques-
tions of state law in order to avoid a constitutional question which was also presented. Clay,
363 U.S. at 213 (Black, J., dissenting).
22 See 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, § 4248, at 157-58.
23 See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing how certification provides an
authoritative determination of state law).
24 See Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 396 (1988) (comparing cer-
tification to "more cumbersome and.., problematic abstention doctrine"); UNIF. CERTIFICA-
TION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT, Commissioner Prefatory note, 12 U.L.A. 49, 52 Commis-
sioner's cmt. (1990). The comments to the Uniform Act note that certification "is a more
rapid method than the use of the abstention doctrine and seems to be a much more orderly
way of handling the problem." Id. This policy was recognized in Griffin Hosp. v. Commis-
sion on Hosps. & Health Care, 782 F.2d 24, 25-26 (2d Cir. 1986). In Griffin, the Second
Circuit held that the district court should have utilized Connecticut's certification statute
rather than exercise abstention and stated that, by using certification, "a federal court can
obtain definitive and speedier answers to the quandaries prompting it to abstain." Id. at 26;
see also Corr & Robbins, supra note 2, at 416-17 (discussing advantages of certification over
abstention); Vincent L. McKusick, Certification: A Procedure for Cooperation Between
State and Federal Courts, 16 ME. L. REV. 33, 38 (1964) (advocating Florida's certification
statute as a way to apply abstention "without at the same time setting procedural traps for
the unwary litigant"). But see Clay, 363 U.S. at 224 (Black, J., dissenting) ("Litigants have
a right to have their lawsuits decided without unreasonable and unnecessary delay or ex-
pense."); L. Cohen & Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, 629 F. Supp. 1419, 1424 (D. Conn. 1986)
(refusing certification because of "time and expense inherent in the certification proce-
dure"); see also Mattis, supra note 17, at 726 (noting that delays of one year were common
when certification was used); Theodore B. Eichelberger, Note, Certification Statutes: Engi-
neering a Solution to Pullman Abstention Delay, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1339, 1357-58
(1984) (noting that certification does not completely eliminate the problems of delay).
2r, The Uniform Act states, in pertinent part:
§ 1. [Power to Answer.] The [Supreme Court] may answer questions of law certi-
fied to it by the Supreme Court of the United States, a Court of Appeals of the
United States, a United States District Court, the United States Court of Interna-
tional Trade, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, the United States
Claims Court, the United States Court of Military Appeals, the United States Tax
Court [or the highest appellate court or the intermediate appellate court of any
other state], when requested by the certifying court if there are involved in any
proceeding before it questions of law of this state which may be determinative of
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disposition of the state law issues by requiring that the certifica-
tion order include all facts necessary to fully disclose the nature of
the controversy.26 Furthermore, an answering court's determina-
tion of a certified question is considered both a binding judicial
decision and authoritative state law precedent. 27
It is submitted that if federal courts are permitted to draw
inferences from the refusal of a state's highest court to answer a
certified question, the goal of obtaining an authoritative determi-
nation of state law will be defeated. While such inferences would
provide for speedy determinations of state law, clearly, no certain
conclusions should be drawn from a state court's inaction. It is un-
tenable that these inferences could be accorded the same authori-
tative status as the carefully researched and thought out opinions
that accompany an answer to a certified question.28 Thus, such in-
the cause then pending in the certifying court and as to which it appears to the
certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the [Supreme
Court] [and the intermediate appellate courts] of this state.
§ 3. [Contents of Certification Order] A certification order shall set forth
(1) the questions of law to be answered; and
(2) a statement of all facts relevant to the questions certified and showing fully
the nature of the controversy in which the questions arose.
UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF LAWS ACT §§ 1, 3, 12 U.L.A. 49, 52-54 (1990). Many states that allow
certification have adopted the Uniform Act. The Committee on Federal Courts, supra note
6, at 103.
2 UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF LAWS ACT § 3, 12 U.L.A. 49, 53 (1990); supra note 25 (text of
§ 3). The comment to § 3 emphasizes that thorough factual disclosure is important to the
authoritative disposition of the issues; answers should not be given "in a vacuum." Id. § 3,
at 53 Commissioner's cmt. Accordingly, the certifying court is encouraged to submit any
material that may be of assistance to the answering court, including exhibits, excerpts from
the record, and a summary of the facts. Id. Inadequate factual disclosure will cause difficul-
ties for the answering court and may be grounds for refusing to answer the certified ques-
tion. See, e.g., In re Question Concerning State Judicial Review of Parole Denial, 610 P.2d
1340, 1341 (Colo. 1980) (en banc) (reluctantly answering certified question where limited
record made it difficult to give definitive answer to question); In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig.,
672 S.W.2d 922, 927 (Ky. 1984) (Vance, J., dissenting) (criticizing lack of factual background
in certified questions); In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827, 833 (Me. 1966) (refusing to answer
certified question because of lack of necessary findings); Hanchey v. Steighner, 549 P.2d
1310, 1311 (Wyo. 1976) (implying lack of complete factual background justifies refusing cer-
tified question); see also infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text (discussion of factual
obscurity and vagueness).
2 See, e.g., Tarr v. Manchester Ins. Corp., 544 F.2d 14, 14 (1st Cir. 1976) (refusing to
"correct" state court interpretation of statute rendered after certified question); Wolner v.
Mahaska Indus., Inc., 325 N.W.2d 39, 41 (Minn. 1983) (stating that response to certified
question is "pronouncement of law with the same effect as our pronouncements of law in
cases arising in the courts of this state").
218 See, e.g., Spencer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 611 P.2d 149, 151 (Kan. 1980)
(certified question examining duty of good faith in insurance law); White v. Edgar, 320 A.2d
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ferences are inappropriate where certainty in the state law is the
predominant goal.29
C. Certification Promotes Cooperative Judicial Federalism
Another goal of certification is to relieve the tension in the re-
lationship between state and federal courts3" by promoting federal-
ism and comity between them.31 A federal court demonstrates re-
spect for state sovereignty when it certifies a question to the state's
highest court and defers to its judgment on unresolved issues of
state law.2 The federal courts also benefit because "[tjhe feeling
668, 679-87 (Me. 1974) (answering certified question regarding whether person in penal in-
stitution who is not absentee voter can qualify as elector); Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting
Co., 443 N.W.2d 112, 114 (Mich. 1989) (discussing exception to employment-at-will doctrine
in response to certified question); Thiry v. Atlantic Monthly Co., 445 P.2d 1012, 1012-13
(Wash. 1968) (en banc) (certified question concerning examining long-arm jurisdiction in
libel case). If an inference is drawn, the federal court will decide an issue without the state
court's reasoned discussions and explanations to assist it. Future decisions on related issues
may be based on this inference without any knowledge of the state's position on the issue.
29 See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text (discussing need for authoritative state
law when federal constitutional questions may arise from a decision on state law). It should
be noted that state courts are unlikely to refuse a certified question when Pullman type
abstention is liable to result. Western Helicopter Servs. v. Rogerson Aircraft Corp., 811 P.2d
627, 632 (Or. 1991); supra note 16 (discussing Pullman abstention).
3o See Mattis, supra note 17, at 724. Such tension may arise, for example, when "a
single district judge overrul[es] the supreme court of the state in post-conviction habeas, in
the takeover of state mental hospitals, prisons and governmental units [or] the constitu-
tional condemnation of state statutes." John R. Brown, Certification-Federalism in Ac-
tion, 7 CUMB. L. REV. 455, 455 (1977). See generally Charles Warren, Federal and State
Court Interference, 43 HARv. L. REV. 345, passim (1930) (discussing various conflicts be-
tween federal and state courts).
" See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974) (certification "helps build a
cooperative judicial federalism"); Brown v. Babbit Ford, Inc., 571 P.2d 689, 695 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1977). Comity refers to the doctrine where "courts of one state or jurisdiction will give
effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction, not as a matter of
obligation, but out of deference and mutual respect." Id.
2 See Mattis, supra note 17, at 724-25; Scanelli, supra note 2, at 641; see also Florida
ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266, 275 (5th Cir.) (en banc), (noting importance of
comity considerations in determining whether to certify questions), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
829 (1976); White, 320 A.2d at 676 (certification promotes federal-state comity).
Commentators have repeatedly praised certification because it promotes comity. Chief
Judge Brown of the Fifth Circuit stated that "[f]riction between two sovereign judicial sys-
tems ... is thereby avoided through certification." Brown, supra note 30, at 465; see also
Philip B. Kurland, Toward a Co-Operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Ab-
stention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 490 (1959) (noting certification would provide "demon-
stration of cooperative judicial federalism"); Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, Certifi-
cation of Unsettled Law Issues, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 29, 1992, at 3, 6 (praising certification for
"promoting interests of federal/state comity"). But see L. Cohen & Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc., 629 F. Supp. 1419, 1423 n.2 (D. Conn. 1986). Though admitting that certification can
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that the federal court [is] 'cooperating' in the search for state law
rather than seeking to impose its will upon the state might...
make state judges more receptive to federal views, when federal
questions [are] before state judiciaries. 33 Furthermore, certifica-
tion enables a federal court to avoid the embarrassment of having
its prediction on a state law issue later overruled by a state's high-
est court. 4 Thus, certification provides benefits for both state and
federal judiciaries and is accomplished by a "cooperative effort of
the federal and State governments. 3 5
It is submitted that this "cooperative judicial federalism" will
suffer if inferences are drawn when a state court does not respond
to a certified question. Once a certified question is refused, the fed-
eral court must resolve the state law question" or, in proper cir-
cumstances, abstain from hearing the case until the state law issue
is resolved.3 7 Whenever a federal court attempts to predict how the
state's highest court would decide an issue, it creates a danger that
the state court may perceive the federal court as trying to "influ-
ence the development of state law."3" If a certifying court may
draw inferences from a state courts refusal to answer a certified
question, there is added potential for friction;39 the state court may
perceive that it is being forced to answer a certified question to
which it would not otherwise have responded.40 Thus, the state
court's discretion whether to answer certified questions will be
restrained.41
promote federalism, the Cohen court warned "[tihe interests of comity and federalism
would hardly be served if the certification of questions ... were to become so widespread."
Id.
" Note, Abstention and Certification in Diversity Suits: "Perfection of Means and
Confusion of Goals", 73 YALE L.J. 850, 865 (1964); see also White, 320 A.2d at 675 (certifi-
cation can "minimize the potential for state-federal tensions arising from actual, or fancied,
federal court efforts to influence the development of state law").
"' See Brown, supra note 30, at 455.
"' Kurland, supra note 32, at 490.
"' See supra note 4.
" See supra notes 18-21 (discussing abstention).
" White v. Edgar, 320 A.2d 668, 675 (Me. 1974).
"9 See Warren, supra note 30, passim (discussing various conflicts between state and
federal judiciaries throughout history).
4" See infra notes 42-59 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why state courts
refuse certified questions).
" See supra note 6.
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II. REASONS FOR REFUSING CERTIFICATION
State courts have refused to answer certified questions for va-
rious reasons,42 and allowing a federal court to draw an inference
based on a refusal would blatantly disregard a specific judicial de-
cision to refrain from adopting a position. Some state courts refuse
to answer certified questions on the ground that these questions
are requests for advisory opinions which are beyond the court's
power to issue.4 The parties must present a "concrete dispute,"
rather than a hypothetical question,44 before these courts are
within their state constitutional powers to decide the matter.45
42 The Committee on Federal Courts, supra -note 6, at 102. When a certified question
complies with the state's certification statute, the state court still has the discretion to ac-
cept or deny certification. See Western Helicopter Servs. v. Rogerson Aircraft Corp., 811
P.2d 627, 629-34 (Or. 1991) (outlining statutory requirements and discretionary factors for
accepting certification); infra notes 42-59 and accompanying text.
An advisory opinion has been defined as:
[A] formal opinion by a judge or judges of a supreme court, or by a supreme court,
in answer to a question of law, submitted by a legislative body or a governor, a
council, or a governor and council, of a state, which question is not related to nor
concerned with a case or controversy in actual litigation at the time, and which
does not involve private rights.
George N. Stevens, Advisory Opinions - Present Status and an Evaluation, 34 WASH. L.
REV. 1, 1-3 (1959). For a general discussion of advisory opinions, see id. passim.
Under the United States Constitution, the judicial power of the United States extends
to "Cases" and "Controversies." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Following this requirement,
federal courts have refused to render decisions where no "case" or "controversy" was in-
volved. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937) ("It must be a real and
substantial controversy... through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from
an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical set of facts."). State courts
have regularly followed this requirement and have refused to render advisory opinions. See
United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855, 859 (Tex. 1965) ("The giving of
advisory opinions is generally recognized as a nonjudicial function .... ") (quoting Douglas
Oil Co. v. State, 81 S.W.2d 1064, 1075 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935)); Brehm v. Retail Food & Drug
Clerks Union No. 1105, 102 P.2d 685, 686 (Wash. 1940) ("The court will not decide a case
where the controversy has ceased and there would be nothing upon which a judgment could
operate.").
" In re Question Concerning State Judicial Review of Parole Denial, 610 P.2d 1340,
1340 (Colo. 1980) (en banc) provides an example of a typical certified question: "Under the
law of Colorado is there an effective available procedure by which a person confined in a
Colorado correctional facility can seek state judicial review of the denial of parole by the
Colorado State Board of Parole?" Id. This type of question, without any accompanying
facts, presents a hypothetical situation, and a court may feel an answer would be an advi-
sory opinion.
45 See Thiry v. Atlantic Monthly Co., 445 P.2d 1012, 1013-14 (Wash. 1968) (en banc).
In Thiry, the certified question asked whether the courts of Washington state can "obtain in
personam jurisdiction over an out-of-state publisher who has circulated an alleged libel in
the state of Washington" Id. at 1013. Judge Weaver explained that the question should not
have been certified on the ground that the court does not have the power to issue advisory
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Some states have averted the problem of advisory opinions by re-
quiring that a response to a certified question be determinative of
the case, thus assuring that the state's courts resolve only actual
controversies. 46
State courts will decline to answer certified questions that are
based on hypothetical fact patterns or are insufficiently grounded
in fact; such questions are deemed abstract.47 It has been suggested
opinions. Id. (Weaver, J., concurring with reservations); see also Leiter Minerals, Inc. v.
California Co., 132 So. 2d 845, 849-50 (La. 1961) (explaining that response to certified ques-
tion would be advisory opinion, but reluctantly answering question "out of respect for" Su-
preme Court, which had certified the issue); In re Elliott, 446 P.2d 347, 370 (Wash. 1968)
("certificate procedure fails to present a justiciable controversy ... within our constitutional
requirements"). But see Spencer v. AetnaLife & Casualty Ins. Co., 611 P.2d 149, 151 (Kan.
1980) (noting that response to certified question does not constitute advisory opinion);
Wolner v. Mahaska Indus., Inc., 325 N.W.2d 39, 41 (Minn. 1982) (rejecting argument that
certified questions are advisory opinions and not binding precedents); see also Christy F.
Harris, Note, Florida's Interjurisdictional Certification Statute: A Reexamination to Pro-
mote Expanded National Use, 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 21, 33 (1969) (criticizing commentators
and judges that characterize certification proceedings as advisory opinions); Corr & Robbins,
supra note 2, at 420 (noting that Florida's state constitution permits advisory opinions).
46 See ALA. RULES APP. PROC. R. 18 (1991) (providing that federal courts may certify
questions when such questions "are determinative of said cause"); Miss. SuP. CT. R. 20
(1991); N.M. ST. ANN. § 34-2-8 (1990) ("[c]ourt's answer must be determinative"); John L.
Deweerdt, Comment, Inter-Jurisdictional Certification and Full Faith and Credit in Fed-
eral Courts, 45 WASH. L. REV. 167, 170-71 (1970) (noting that advisory opinions avoided by
requirement that answer be determinative of case). State courts have refused to respond to
certified questions when the response would not resolve the issue. See Greene v. Massey,
384 So. 2d 24, 27-28 (Fla. 1980); Schlieter v. Carlos, 775 P.2d 709, 710-11 (N.M. 1989).
Federal courts have also considered these statutes in determining whether or not to
certify a question to the state courts. See, e.g., Ormsbee Dev. Co. v. Grace, 668 F.2d 1140,
1149 (10th Cir.) ("[Clertification ... is not appropriate when ... the issue certified would
not be determinative of the issues before us on appeal."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 838 (1982);
Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1242 n.5 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting Missis-
sippi certification statute requiring response to be "determinative of said cause"), cert. de-
nied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981). It should be noted that this requirement is a modification of the
Uniform Act, which states that questions "may be determinative of the cause" UNIF. CERTI-
FICATION OF LAWS ACT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 49, 52 (1990) (emphasis added); supra note 25 (text of
§ 1). However, some state courts have interpreted certification statutes which read "may be
determinative of the cause," as "must be determinative of the cause," and thus apply a
stricter standard. See Retail Software Servs., Inc. v. Lashlee, 525 N.E.2d 737, 737 (N.Y.
1988) (per curiam). In Retail Software, although the New York certification statute requires
that questions "may be determinative of the cause," the court of appeals refused to answer
the certified question stating that the requirement had not been met. Id.; see also Masters
Mach. Co. v. Brookfield Athletic Shoe Co., 663 F. Supp. 439, 441 (D. Me. 1987) (refusing to
grant motion for certification due to lack of determinability even though statute did not
require such).
17 See Levin, supra note 1, at 351; Kaplan, supra note 16, at 431; see also In re Ques-
tion Concerning State Judicial Review of Parole Denial, 610 P.2d 1340, 1341 (Colo. 1980)
(en banc) (answering certified question but noting limited record accompanying question);
Thompson v. State, 170 N.W.2d 101, 103 (Minn. 1969) ("An appellate court will not con-
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that abstract questions prevent the answering court from focusing
on the critical issues, and thus generate conjectural responses.48
Furthermore, some commentators have asserted that an abstract
question amounts to an improper demand that a state's highest
court settle an academic dispute.4 9 To prevent abstractness, several
states require certified questions to be briefed and argued.50 How-
ever, if the questions are still too abstract to be resolved, the state
court will refrain from answering them.5 1 As with a refusal to issue
an advisory opinion, the state court has not addressed the legal
issues presented in a certified question when it refuses to answer
due to abstractness in the question, and likewise no inferences as
to the court's view should be drawn from its refusal to respond.
State courts have refused certification, in other circumstances,
without ever reaching the state legal issue presented by the ques-
tion. Thus, if the state court perceives that the question presents a
federal constitutional issue,52 or if the state court finds that there
is already state law precedent on which the federal court could
have relied,53 certification will be denied. Furthermore, if a party
removes a case from state to federal court, a state court may rule
later that the litigant forfeited the right to certification. 4
In other situations, certification has been refused based on the
sider abstract or unnecessarily general questions .... ); see also supra note 26 (discussing
importance of factual background in certification).
' See Levin, supra note 1, at 351; Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266,
275 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 829 (1976) (noting that framing of issue is
key factor to be considered in deciding on certification).
" Lillich & Mundy, supra note 1, at 901. A state's highest court should not "resolve
academic disputes submitted by federal judges, nor should federal judges be encouraged to
make such demands." Id.
10 See Levin, supra note 1, at 352 n.61 (citing cases requiring briefs and arguments).
The Uniform Act provides that local law governs briefs and arguments for certified ques-
tions. UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF LAWS ACT § 6, 12 U.L.A. 49, 54 (1990).
" See supra notes 47-48.
See, e.g., White v. Edgar, 320 A.2d 668, 678 (Me. 1974) ("[Flederal constitutional
issues should not be decided if they may be reasonably avoided."); Widgeon v. Eastern
Shore Hosp. Ctr., 479 A.2d 921, 927 (Md. 1984) (declining certified question since argument
was "essentially one of federal court jurisdiction and federal constitutional law); Abrams v.
West Va. Racing Comm'n, 263 S.E.2d 103, 106 (W. Va. 1980) (declining to answer certified
question dealing with constitutional claim).
" Western Helicopter Servs. v. Rogerson Aircraft Corp., 811 P.2d 627, 630-31, 635 (Or.
1991) (holding that appellate court decision was precedent on which the federal court could
rely). The Uniform Act allows the state court to answer certified questions where there is
"no controlling precedent." UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF LAWS ACT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 49, 52 (1990);
supra note 25 (text of § 1).
" Rose, supra note 2, at 440.
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state court's deliberate decision not to address a particular legal
issue. For instance, state courts have refused certification when no
recurrent state issues are involved,55 when the issue was not ripe
for determination, 6 or when the court wished to afford lower
courts the opportunity to rule on the particular issue. 7 In addi-
tion, a state court may prefer to delay adjudication of a particu-
larly controversial issue58 and at least one court has refused to an-
swer a certified question where the case did not "involve any
matter of great public interest presenting any unique or unusual
legal problem not already decided by this Court. ' 5 Thus, because
a refusal by a state supreme court to answer a certified question
may occur for various reasons, permitting an inference based on
such a refusal would be illogical.
III. REFUSAL TO TAKE CERTIFICATION AND DENIAL OF CERTIORARI
Certification of questions in some aspects resembles the Su-
preme Court writ of certiorari.6 0  A writ of certiorari "will be
" See Brown, supra note 30, at 457; see, e.g., Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. North River Ins.
Co., 949 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that question presented "is likely to recur"); Barnes
v. Atlantic & Pac. Life Ins. Co., 514 F.2d 704, 706 (5th Cir. 1975) (granting certification
because of ordinary and repetitive nature of contract dispute); Motor Vehicle Casualty Co.
v. Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co., 374 F.2d 601, 602 n.1 (5th Cir. 1967) (refusing certification where
issue was not repetitive).
56 See Lawrence L. Piersol, Note, Certifying Questions to State Supreme Court as a
Remedy to the Abstention Doctrine, 9 S.D. L. REV. 158, 173 (1964). If an issue is not "ripe,"
a court often feels that the question is not ready for determination. Id.; see also United Pub.
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 88-91 (1947) (plaintiffs' claim not ripe because while they
expressed desire to engage in prohibited political activity they had not yet done so); cf.
Hanchey v. Steighneer, 549 P.2d 1310, 1310-11 (Wyo. 1976) (denying certification and not-
ing that federal case was only in pleading stage).
" See Rufino v. United States, 506 N.E.2d 910, 911 (N.Y. 1987) (resolution of impor-
tant state issues is preferable to "secure the benefit afforded by our normal process-the
considered deliberation and writing of our intermediate appellate court[s]"); see also Allan
D. Vestal, The Certified Question of Law, 36 IOWA L. REV. 629, 635 (1951) (noting that
highest state court may desire to wait a period of time before addressing issue).
58 See Levin, supra note 1, at 360 n.102 (citing Moore & Vestal, Present and Potential
Role of Certification in Federal Appellate Procedure, 35 VA. L. REV. 1, 43 (1949)).
" Cowan v. Ford Motor Co., 437 So. 2d 46, 47 (Miss. 1983). The Cowan court also
declined to answer the question on the ground that it involved the interpretation of a state
statute that had previously been construed. Id.; see also Stein v. Darby, 134 So. 2d 232, 237
(Fla. 1961) (denying appeal to Supreme Court of Florida due to lack of "great public
interest").
"0 The writ of certiorari is the discretionary device used by the Supreme Court to deter-
mine which cases it will hear. See Richard L. Revesz & Pamela S. Karlan, Nonmajority
Rules and the Supreme Court, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1068-70 (1988). The Supreme
Court's "Rule of Four" requires that four justices must vote to hear a case in order to grant
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granted only where there are special and important reasons there-
for."'61 Similarly, it is not mandatory that a state supreme court
respond to a certified question. 2 Just as some state courts refuse
certification where the issue involved is not recurrent 3 or does not
involve great public interest or importance,64 the Supreme Court,
in deciding whether to grant certiorari, may consider "whether the
questions as presented are sufficiently important... to justify and
require the court to let the case into the court for a full hearing on
the merits. '6 5 Moreover, both certification and certiorari are proce-
dural devices through which courts determine unresolved issues.
The procedures are analogous in that a federal court will certify a
question to receive an authoritative determination of state law66
and the Supreme Court will grant certiorari in order to make an
authoritative determination of an unresolved issue when, for exam-
ple, there are conflicting interpretations of an issue in different
jurisdictions.6
certiorari. Id. Generally, once this requirement is met, the Supreme Court will schedule
briefing and oral argument. Id. at 1069. See generally ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME
COURT PRACTICE §§ 2.1-2.19, 3.1-3.18, at 40-144 (6th ed. 1986) (discussing Supreme Court's
certiorari jurisdiction to review federal and state court decisions).
"' Revesz & Karlan, supra note 60, at 1072 (quoting Sup. CT. R. 17); see also John M.
Harlan, Manning the Dikes, Address Before the Eighteenth Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo
Lecture Delivered Before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Oct. 28, 1958),
in 13 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y., (Dec. 1958), at 541, 543. Prior to the Judiciary Act of 1925, the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction was approximately 80% obligatory and 20% discretionary. Id.
at 543. The discretionary jurisdiction of the Court was greatly increased after the Act was
passed, while the obligatory jurisdiction was limited. Id.
62 See supra notes 6, 42-59 and accompanying text.
63 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
64 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
' Revesz & Karlan, supra note 60, at 1072 (quoting Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of
Appeals and United States Supreme Court: Hearings on the H.R. 10479 Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1922) (testimony of Chief Justice Taft)).
"8 See supra notes 3, 23-27 and accompanying text.
17 See Revesz & Karlan, supra note 60, at 1072. The Supreme Court may exercise its
discretion and grant certiorari in the following circumstances:
(a) When a federal court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with the
decision of another federal court of appeals on the same matter; or has decided a
federal question in a way in conflict with a state court of last resort; or has so far
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this
court's power of supervision.
(b) When a state court of last resort has decided a federal question in a way in
conflict with the decision of another state court of last resort or of a federal court
of appeals.
(c) When a state court or federal court of appeals has decided an important ques-
tion of federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or has
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It is suggested that because numerous analogies may be drawn
between the certification and certiorari procedures, the two devices
should be treated similarly. Therefore, since a denial of certiorari
"carries with it no implication whatever regarding the Court's
views on the merits of a case," 8 federal courts should be precluded
from drawing an inference from a state court's refusal to answer a
certified question. The denial of certiorari "simply means that
fewer than four members of the Court deemed it desirable to re-
view a decision of the lower court as a matter 'of sound judicial
discretion,' ,,;69 such a denial cannot be construed as evidence that
the Court believed the decision of the lower court was correct.
70
Just as narrow technical or public policy reasons may cause the
Court to deny certiorari, 71 similar reasons may exist for the highest
court of a state to refuse to accept a certified question. 72 Therefore,
since an inference is prohibited when the Supreme Court denies
certiorari, likewise it should not be permitted when a state's high-
est court declines to answer a certified question.
decided a federal question in a way in conflict with applicable decisions of this
Court.
Id. at 1072-73 (quoting Sup. CT. R. 17).
8 Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950); see Commonwealth of
Pa. v. Brown, 392 F.2d 120, 123 (3d Cir.) ("[T]here is no inference permissible from [the
Court's] denial of application for certiorari, favorable or unfavorable to either side of a liti-
gation."), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921 (1968); Daytona Beach Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Weinberger,
435 F. Supp. 891, 898 (M.D. Fla. 1977) (noting that "denial of certiorari [by Supreme Court]
carries with it no import"); Rutledge v. City of Miami, 267 F. Supp. 885, 887 (S.D. Fla.
1967) ("[Djenial of certiorari ... does not carry with it the presumption that the appellate
court affirms sub silentio the action taken by the lower court."). But see United States v.
Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 443 (1973) (according "some significance" to denial of certiorari); Rad-
cliff v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 1093, 1096 (10th Cir. 1974) (stating that denial of certiorari may
be some indication of Supreme Court's view on issue), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 939 (1975).
"9 Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. at 917; see also STERN, supra note 60, at 269 (ex-
plaining that denial of certiorari only "expresses the Court's discretionary refusal to give
any kind of appellate review to the decision below").
70 See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Court Decisions and the Supreme Court, Address
Before the Annual Meeting of the Pennsylvania Bar Association (Feb. 3, 1960), in 31 PA.
B.A. Q. June 1960, at 393, 402. Justice Brennan stressed that a denial of certiorari is not an
affirmance. Id. He explained that he has often denied certiorari even when he thought the
lower court decision was wrong. Id.
", See Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. at 918. Justice Frankfurter laid out various
reasons why the Court denies certiorari. See id. For example, the issue may be moot or not
ripe, the record may be unclear, the lower court's judgment may not be determinative or the
judgment may not be from a court of last resort. Id.; see also Brennan, supra note 70, at
402-03 (listing possible reasons for denial of certiorari).
72 See supra notes 43-59 and accompanying text (discussing ripeness and abstractness
as reasons for refusing to take certification).
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CONCLUSION
Certification allows a federal court to obtain an authoritative
determination of state law from the highest court of the state with-
out imposing undue delays or expenses upon the litigants. Because
the device will continue to be used by federal courts in the future,
it is important to realize that a state court's refusal to answer a
certified question should not be construed as an acceptance of a
prior federal decision on that issue. Permitting such an inference
would amount to a disregard for the various reasons why a state
court may refuse certification and would defeat the purposes and
policies behind the procedure. This Note has suggested that, be-
cause the certification of questions is similar to the writ of certio-
rari and because inferences based on the Supreme Court's denial of
certiorari are prohibited, federal courts, reciprocally, should not be
permitted to make assumptions when a certified question is re-
fused. If certification is to be widely used in the future, it must be
used correctly; otherwise, its benefits will be lost.
Richard Alan Chase
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